Africa GBV Observatory › Morocco tracker
September 2026 | Morocco GBV Tracker
5 indexed fatal people · 1 indexed serious non-fatal event. Review: 25 October 2026 · published 26 October 2026.
This calendar period has ended; the incomplete register remains open to late reports and corrections. This is an incomplete, nonprobability public-source register. It cannot estimate national incidence, prevalence or perpetrator distributions and must not be used to rank countries.
Counting note: fatal figures count people; serious non-fatal figures count distinct events. These are different units and should not be added together. See Methods & Data Dictionary →
Fatal people
| Stable ID · dates, evidence and sources | Person or safe identifier | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| MA-GBV-2026-002 | Tunfite adult woman · identity withheld | Fatal person |
| MA-GBV-2026-003 | Midelt-province child · identity withheld | Fatal person |
| MA-GBV-2026-004 | Oujdan adult woman · identity withheld | Fatal person |
| MA-GBV-2026-005 | Marrakech-region adult woman · identity withheld | Fatal person |
Serious non-fatal events
No qualifying date-assigned record is indexed in this category. This is not evidence that no violence occurred.
Month and cumulative reconciliation
September: 5 fatal people / 1 non-fatal event. Cumulative from August through this month: 6 fatal people / 1 non-fatal event.
Fatal people and non-fatal events use different units. Linked survivors in one episode remain one non-fatal event. Full occurrence/discovery dates, provisional classifications, gender fields, justice status and source URLs are preserved in each linked history.
Research records outside totals
Open undated, unclassified and out-of-coverage leads. These are not additional counted cases for this month.
11 October correction note
MA-GBV-2026-003: child gender disputed; no count change. MA-GBV-2026-006: October fatal 0→1. Pre-publication correction: MA-NF-2026-001 dates an arrest, not the attack; exclude pending occurrence date and territorial-scope review. October non-fatal remains 0.
Country correction history · Public change log
Month-end documentation finding
Use explicit unknown or disputed categories for victim attributes. Record arrest and occurrence dates separately, and distinguish survivor numbers from event counts.
Earlier dated reporting notes
The following dated notes preserve earlier reporting and follow-up. The reconciled tables above govern current counts; publication and court dates in these notes do not create new incidents.
Observatory update · 4 October 2026
New investigation links Morocco’s domestic intelligence service to Pegasus surveillance.
An Amnesty International investigation published on 1 October identifies the Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DGST), Morocco’s domestic intelligence service, as the entity it says operated Pegasus spyware against journalists, human-rights defenders and other targets.
The investigation combines forensic analysis of spyware attacks with leaked surveillance records, legal documents, interviews and testimony from a former DGST employee. Amnesty says important parts of the former employee’s account were corroborated with technical evidence and independent sources. Its research also draws on previously unpublished material from Pegasus developer NSO Group that emerged from litigation involving WhatsApp and Meta.
Amnesty says it matched 103 Moroccan telephone numbers entered into the Pegasus system between September and December 2017 to identifiable people. Sixty-five belonged to civil-society figures: 34 human-rights defenders, 22 journalists and media workers, five lawyers and four academics. Another 25 belonged to political representatives or officials, while five belonged to diplomats or representatives of international organisations.
The investigation says forensic evidence links multiple Pegasus attacks to the same operator and documents infection methods including malicious links, zero-click attacks and network-injection attacks. Amnesty concludes that Pegasus was used by Moroccan authorities between 2017 and 2021, and possibly later.
Other claims require a different level of caution. The report describes physical surveillance, covert audio and video recording, telephone interception and devices allegedly compromised before reaching their users. Those details rely more heavily on whistleblower testimony and are therefore retained here as attributed allegations, not independently established facts.
Moroccan authorities have repeatedly denied using Pegasus to spy on citizens. Amnesty says it wrote to the authorities four weeks before publication of this investigation and received no response. A lack of response is not an admission.
The new element is not simply another allegation that Pegasus was used in Morocco. It is Amnesty’s attempt to identify which state service operated the system, supported by technical analysis, targeting records and corroborated insider testimony. The Committee to Protect Journalists has since called on Morocco to stop surveillance of journalists and investigate abuses.
This is a human-rights and civic-space entry. It does not alter Morocco’s GBV case totals.
Classification: Human Rights · Civic Space · Press Freedom · Freedom of Expression · Privacy · Surveillance · Human Rights Defenders · Accountability.
Back to Morocco · Other month · Africa directory
Publication correction · 26 October 2026
MA-GBV-2026-007 and MA-NF-2026-002: linked September event added as one fatal person and one non-fatal event; September 4/0→5/1, cumulative 6/0→7/1. The alleged actor’s self-inflicted death is contextual, not a second GBV fatal person.
